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I. 
INTRODU~I~N 
Stephen  Neal,  Chairman  of  the  House  Banking 
Subcommittee  on  Domestic  Monetary  Policy,  has 
introduced  legislation  (H.  J.  Res.  409)  requiring 
that  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  shall  adopt  and  pursue  monetary  policies 
to  reduce  inflation  gradually  in  order  to  eliminate  inflation 
by  not  later  than  5 years  from  the  date  of  this  enactment 
of  this  legislation  and  shall  then  adopt  and  pursue  mone- 
tary  policies  to  maintain  price  stability. 
This  paper  argues  for  passage  of  the  Neal  Resolu- 
tion,  which  would  make  price  level  stability  the  domi- 
nant  goal  of  monetary  policy.  The  alternative  to  a 
rule  that  mandates  price  stability  is the  exercise  of 
ongoing  discretion  over  the  desired  price  level.  This 
discretion,  it is argued,  encourages  groups  that  benefit 
from  high  and  variable  inflation  to lobby  the  political 
system.  A rule  is desirable  primarily  because  it limits 
the  incentives  for  special-interest  politics. 
An earlier  experience  with  discretionary  monetary 
policy  occurred  under  the  Articles  of Confederation 
(178 l-l  789).  On  the  basis  of this  experience,  James 
Madison  concluded  that  discretion  creates  political 
pressures  from  special  interest  constituencies. 
Madison  and  the  other  authors  of the  Constitution, 
therefore,  took  discretionary  control  over. the  price 
level  away  from  government.  Article  I,  Section  8 of 
the  Constitution  empowered  Congress  to  “coin 
money”  and “regulate  the  value  thereof.”  Today,  this 
language  appears  general.  At  the  time,  however,  it 
was  clearly  understood  as  restricting  Congress  to 
specifying  the  metallic  content  of  coins.  [See 
Timberlake  (1989)  and  Christainsen  (1988),  especi- 
ally the  references  in footnote  2 of the  latter  paper.] 
The  first  part  of the  paper  reviews  the  importance 
the  authors  of the  Constitution  placed  on  constrain- 
ing discretionary  issue  of paper  money.  The  second 
part  of the  paper  argues  that  the  recent  experience 
with  discretion  vindicates  Madison’s  judgment  that 
discretion  nurtures  special-interest  politics.  In replac- 
ing discretion  with  a rule,  the  Neal  Resolution  would 
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reestablish  the  original  intent  of  the  authors  of  the 
Constitution  and  return  price  level  determination  to 




By  1787,  James  Madison  and  his correspondents, 
including  James  Monroe,  George  Washington,  and 
Edmund  Randolph,  had  concluded  that  the  ascen- 
dancy  of parochial  political  interests  over  the  national 
interest  was  spreading  disorder  and  leading  to  a 
disintegration  of the  Union.  A primary  manifestation 
of  these  parochial  interests  was  overissue  of  paper 
money.  State  legislatures  were  pressured  by  debtors 
to  pass  laws  making  paper  money  legal  tender  and 
then  to  issue  large  amounts  of  it.  By  1786,  seven 
states  had  adopted  paper  money  as  legal  tender. 
Madison  wrote  to  his  brother  on  August  7,  1786 
(Madison  1975,  p.  89): 
. . . the  States  are  running  mad  after  paper  money,  which 
among  other  evils  disables  them  from  all contributions  of 
specie  for  paying  the  public  debts,  particularly  the  foreign 
one.  In  Rhode  Island  a  large  sum  has  been  struck  and 
made  a  tender,  and  a  severe  penalty  imposed  on  any 
attempt  to  discriminate  between  it  and  coin.  The  conse- 
quence  is  that  provisions  are  withheld  from  the  Market, 
the  Shops  shut  up-a  general  distress  and  tumultuous 
meetings. 
Shortly  thereafter,  he  wrote  to  Thomas  Jefferson 
complaining  of  the  “warfare  &  retaliation”  among 
states  that  were  passing  laws  enabling  their  citizens 
to pay  out-of-state  debts  in depreciated  paper  money 
(Madison  1975,  pp.  94-S). 
In Spring  1787,  Madison  wrote  the  memorandum 
“Vices  of the  Political  System  of the  United  States” 
in preparation  for the  Federal  Convention  to be  held 
at Philadelphia  in May.  In “Vices” Madison  addressed 
the  problem  of how  to  prevent  a national  legislature 
from  following  the  examples  set  by  state  legislatures, 
where  majorities  had  violated  the  rights  of individuals 
and  minorities.  Madison  first  described  how  unre- 
strained  majority  rule  encouraged  majorities  to 
exploit  minorities  (Madison  1975,  pp.  354-5): 
These  causes  lie  1.  in  the  Representative  bodies.  2.  in 
the  people  themselves. 
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1.  ambition.  2.  personal  interest.  3.  public  good.  Un- 
happily  the  two  first  are  proved  by  experience  to  be  most 
prevalent. 
2.  A still more  fatal if not  more  frequent  cause  lies  among 
the  people  themselves.  All  civilized  societies  are  divided 
into  different  interests  and  factions,  as  they  happen  to  be 
creditors  or debtors-rich  or poor-husbandmen,  merchants 
or  manufacturers-members  of  different  religious  sects- 
followers of different political leaders-inhabitants  of diierent 
districts-owners  of different  kinds  of property  &c  &c.  In 
republican  Government  the  majority,  however  composed, 
ultimately  give  the  law. 
Madison  argued  that  appeals  made  on  the  basis 
of  the  “general  and  permanent  good  of  the  Com- 
munity, ” “character,”  or “religion”  would  do little  to 
prevent  majorities formed  out of these  special interest 
groups  from exploiting  minorities  (Madison  1975,  pp. 
355-6): 
Is  it  to  be  imagined  that  an  ordinary  citizen  or  even  an 
assembly-man  of  R.  Island  in  estimating  the  policy  of 
paper  money,  ever  considered  or  cared  in  what  light  the 
measure  would  be  viewed  in  France  or  Holland;  or  even 
Massts  or Connect.?  It was  a sufficient  temptation  to  both 
that  it was  popular  in  the  State;  to  the  former  that  it was 
so  in  the  neighbourhood.  .  .  . Place  three  individuals  in  a 
situation  wherein  the  interest  of each  depends  on the  voice 
of the  others,  and  give  to  two  of them  an interest  opposed 
to  the  rights  of  the  third.  Will  the  latter  be  secure?  The 
prudence  of every  man would  shun  the  danger.  The  rules  & 
forms  of  justice  suppose  and  guard  against  it.  Will  two 
thousand  in  a like  situation  be  less  likely  to  encroach  on 
the  rights  of one  thousand?  The  contrary  is witnessed  by 
the  notorious  factions  &  oppressions  which  take  place  in 
corporate  towns  limited  as  the  opportunities  are,  and  in 
little  republics  when  uncontrouled  by  apprehensions  of 
external  danger. 
Madison  concludes  by expounding  the famous  idea 
of  Essays  No.  10  and  No.  5 1 in  Tire Federaht.  In 
a national  legislature  in a large  country,  the  general 
interest  is protected  because  the  large  numbers  of 
disparate  groups  make  it difficult  to form  exploitive 
majority  coalitions  (Madison  1975,  p.  357): 
The  Society  becomes  broken  into  a  greater  variety  of 
interests,  of pursuits,  of passions,  which  check  each  other, 
whilst  those  who  may  feel  a common  sentiment  have  less 
opportunity  of communication  and  concert. 
Inevitably,  citizens  will form  political  groups  in an 
attempt  to use the  coercive  power  of the  state  to fur- 
ther  their  own  self-interests,  rather  than  the  general 
interest.  In  Th  Fedmakt  No.  10,  Madison  accepts 
the  reality  of factionalism  in government  promoted 
by  self-interest.  The  separation  of powers,  checks 
and  balances,  and  the  federal  system  embodied  in 
the  Constitution  were  designed  to  restrain  self- 
interest  through  “supplying  by  opposite  and  rival 
interests  the  defect  of better  motives”  (Tire  Fedwahit 
No.  51). 
The  Constitutional  Convention  ended  the  discre- 
tion  of state  legislatures  over  the  price  level  and the 
issue of paper  money.  Article  I, Sec.  10 of the  Con- 
stitution  states  that  “No  state  shall . . . coin  money; 
emit  bills  of  credit  [paper  money];  make  anything 
but gold and silver coin a tender  in payment  of debts.” 
Article  I,  Sec.  8  gave  the  Federal  government  the 
power  “to  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
and  of foreign  coin,  and  fii  the  standard  of weights 
and  measures.”  To  the  framers  of the  Constitution, 
this  language  clearly  committed  the  United  States 
to  a  specie  standard.’ 
In  many  states  during  the  Confederation  period, 
state  legislatures  had  arbitrarily  set  aside  commer- 
cial contracts.  Through  inflation  caused  by  printing 
paper  money,  states  had abrogated  contracts  in favor 
of debtors.  Article  I, Sec.  10 of the Constitution  pro- 
hibits  states  from  “impairing  the  obligation  of con- 
tracts.”  (Later,  in  the  same  spirit,  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  stated  “nor  shall any  State  deprive  any 
person  of life, liberty,  or  property  without  due  pro- 
cess  of law.“)  Removing  discretionary  control  over 
the  price  level  from  government  was  a key  device 
for  enforcing  the  principle  that  government  should 
not  impair  contractual  obligations. 
The  authors  of  the  Constitution  carefully  com- 
promised  between  the  need  to give government  the 
power  to raise revenue  and the need  to protect  private 
property  from  arbitrary  seizure.  The  Constitution 
separates  the  branch  of  government  that  spends 
public  monies  from  the  branch  that  levies  taxes.  It 
safeguards  this  separation  by  giving  Congress  ex- 
clusive  rights  “to borrow  money  on the  credit  of the 
United  States.”  The  Executive  Branch  cannot  spend 
money  “but  in consequence  of appropriations  made 
by law.”  By reserving  to Congress  the  power  to tax, 
the  authors  of  the  Constitution  ensured  that  the 
exercise  of  this  power  would  be  accompanied  by 
public  discussion.  Furthermore,  “bills  for  raising 
revenue  shall  originate  in  the  House,”  whose 
i Christainsen  (1988,  p.  427)  writes:  The  first draft  of the  Con- 
stitution  gave  the  legislature  of the  United  States  the  power  to 
“emit  bills”  [paper  money].  On  August  16,  1787,  however,  the 
convention  moved  to  strike  this  power  from  the  Constitution, 
and  in Madison’s  account,  “striking  out  the  words  .  .  . cut  off 
the  pretext  for a paper  currency,  and particularly  for making  the 
bills  a tender  either  for  public  or  private  debt.”  Of  the  eleven 
delegates  whose  remarks  Madison  reported,  ten  clearly put  forth 
the  view  .  .  . that  striking  the  phrase  in  question  would  deny 
Congress  any power,  under  any  circumstances,  to create  paper 
money. 
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A  specie  standard  was  one  of the  checks  imposed 
to  assure’  that  taxes  were  imposed  only  through 
explicit.legislation.  Congressional  responsibility  “to 
coin  money”  was  designed  to prevent  the  Executive 
Branch  from  copying  the  behavior  of sovereigns  who 
levied  taxes  through  debasement  of  the  coinage.. 
Iii. 
THE RECENT EXPERIMENTIN  DISCRETION 
Although  the  specie  standard  lapsed  under  the 
pressure  to  finance  the  Civil  War  with  greenbacks, 
it  was  reestablished  in  1878.  When  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  was established  in  191.3, it was  sub- 
jected  to the  discipline  of the  gold  standard.  Federal 
Reserve  notes  were  subject  to  a  40  percent  gold 
reserve.  Battered  by the  Debression  and  two  world 
wars,  the  gold  standard  metamorphosed  into  the 
Bretton  Woods  system,  under  which  the  Federal 
Reserve  felt  constrained  to  raise  interest  rates  in 
response  to  gold  outflows.  Because  domestic  infla- 
tion  was viewed  as the  major  cause  of gold  outflows, 
the  Federal  Reserve  kept  inflation  at a low level.  To 
a  considerable  degree,  the  Bretton  Woods  system 
limited  government  discretion  over  the  price  level. 
This  limitation  on discretion  began  to break  down 
in the  1960s  however,  when  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  stopped  raising  interest  rates  to prevent  gold 
outflows.  In  1963, Allan Sproul(1980,  pp.  12 1, 126), 
president  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York, 
made  an  early,  eloquent  plea  for  discretion: 
[The  Federal  Reserve  Act]  was  a determination  that  there 
was  to be  a degree  of monetary  management  in the  United 
States.  But  because  of  ancient  prejudices  and  still  lively 
suspicions  .  .  .  it  was  thought  that  this  power  could  be 
substantially  divorced  from  acts  of discretion.  . . . Changes 
in  the  production  of  gold,  the  international  balance  of 
payments,  and  the  rise  and  fall of the  self-generated  credit 
needs  of  agriculture,  commerce,  and  industry  were  to 
determine,  pretty  largely,  the  amounts  of  Reserve  Bank 
credit  which  would  come  into  being  or go out  of existence. 
. . . It  seems  to  me  patent  that  the  uncertain  hand  of man 
is  needed  in  a  world  of  uncertainties  and  change  and 
human  beings,  to  try  to  accommodate  the  performance  of 
the  monetary  system  to  the  needs  of particular  times  and 
circumstances  and  people.  I  here  agree  with  Professor 
Samuelson,  of the  Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology, 
who  has  written  that  “a definitive  mechanism,  which  is to 
run  forever  after,  by  itself,  involves  a single  act  of discre- 
tion  which  transcends,  in  both  its  arrogance  and  its  ca- 
pacity  for  potential  harm,  any  repeated  acts  of  foolish 
discretion  that  can  be  imagined.” 
Later,  discretion  came  to  be  defended  primarily 
as allowing  the  Federal  Reserve  to  vary  the  money 
stock  in  line  with  changes  in  money  demand.  In 
actual  fact,  changes  in  the  .money  stock  far  ex- 
ceeded  changes  in money  demand.2  Discretion  was 
exercised  primarily  in  trading  off the  goal  of  price 
stability  against  other  goals. 
IV. 
THEINFLATION TAX 
Inflation  generates  revenue  directly  through  the 
increase  in fiat money  that  creates  the  inflation.  More 
important,  inflation  ‘interacts  ‘with the  lack  of index- 
ing  in the  tax  code  to  increase  tax  revenue.  Finally, 
unanticipated  inflation  reduces  the  real  value  of the 
taxes  the  government  must  impose  to  pay  holders 
of  existing  government  debt.. 
After  1964,  the  political  system  was  under  cons- 
tant  pressure  to increase  revenue.  The  1964  general 
election  provided  the  congressional  votes  to  under- 
take  a broad  expansion  of income  redistribution  pro- 
grams.3  Two  years  later,  the  Vietnam  War  defense 
buildup  began.  After  the  mid-1960s,  a  rapidly 
growing  economy  that  would  generate  continuous  in- 
creases  in revenue  for defense  and  domestic  spend- 
ing programs  became  a dominant  political  concern. 
Initially,  the  political  system  accepted  inflation  as the 
cost  of high  real growth  and the government  revenue 
generated  by  that  real  growth.  Later,  the  political 
system  came  to  depend  directly  upon  inflation  for 
revenue. 
Before  indexation  in  1985,  inflation  increased  the 
real  revenue  raised  by  the  personal  income  tax.  In- 
flation pushed  individuals with unchanged  real income 
out  of tax-exempt  into  taxable  status.  It eroded  the 
real  value  of  the  standard  deduction.  Most  impor- 
tant,  due  to the  progressive  rate  structure  of the  per- 
sonal  income  tax,  inflation  increased  real revenue  by 
moving  individuals  with  unchanged  real  income 
into  higher  marginal  tax  brackets.  Inflation  still 
2 From  1965  to  1989,  real  GNP  doubled.  Because  the  public’s 
demand  for  the  purchasing  power  represented  by  M2 rises  in 
line  with  real  GNP.  the  demand  for  real  M2  also  doubled.  In 
contrast,  the  stock  of M2  rose  sevenfold.  According  to the  ouan- 
tity theory,  the  excess  supply  of M2  should  cause  %e price  ]evel 
to  rise  bv  a factor  of  3.5  (7/Z  =  3.5).  Over  the  oeriod  1965 
to  1989, the  implicit  price  deflator  increased  by  almost  exactly 
that  factor. 
3 In  the  election,  Democrats  had  campaigned  for  a  national 
medical  care  program  (Medicare)  and  a Social  Security  program 
with  universal  coverage.  In  contrast,  Republicans  had  cam- 
paigned  for  Social  Security  coverage  limited  to  the  needy 
elderly  and financed  out of general  revenues.  The  elections  gave 
the  Democrats  a  295-146  majority  in  the  House  and  a-net 
increase  of 4’2 Northern  Democrats.  The  conservative  coalition 
of Republicans  and  Southern  Democrats  that  had blocked  social 
legislation  in  the  1950s  crumbled. 
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in other  parts  of the  tax  code.  The  capital  gains  tax 
is  levied  not  only  on  real  gains,  but  also  on  paper 
gains  that  only  compensate  for  inflation.  Revenue 
from  estate  taxes  rises  as  inflation  lowers  the  real 
value  of  the  estate  tax  exemption.  Inflation  raises 
corporate  taxes  by eroding  the  real value  of depreci- 
ation  allowances,  which  are based  on historical  cost, 
rather  than  replacement  cost.  It also raises  corporate 
taxes  through  increases  in the  dollar  value  of inven- 
tories  that  augment  measured  profits,  but  not  real 
profits. 
Studies  done  for  the  year  1974,  when  the  infla- 
tion  rate  was  11 percent,  yield  the  conclusion  that 
inflation  increased  federal  tax  revenue  in  that  year 
by  17 percent.  (See  Appendix.  Because  of the  com- 
plexity  of  the  federal  tax  code,  construction  of  an 
annual  series  on  revenue  increases  produced  by  in- 
flation  would  require  considerable  work.)  Although 
the  revenue  raised  by inflation  varied  over  time  with 
the  inflation  rate,  this  revenue  contributed  signifi- 
cantly  to  total  revenue  until  the  reduction  in  the 
inflation  rate  in  the  1980s  and  the  indexing  of the 
personal  income  tax  in  1985. 
V. 
INCOMETFUNSFERSAND  INFLATION 
The  combination  of inflation and government  price 
fiing  allows  the  political  system  to circumvent  legal 
prohibitions  against  arbitrary  confiscation  of private 
property.  Revenue  transfers  imposed  by  this  com- 
bination  are  not  subject  to  the  checks  and  balances 
and  public  discussion  that  constrain  the  enactment 
of explicit  tax legislation.  By reducing  public  discus- 
sion,  such  transfers  avoid  criticism  for  providing 
benefits  to groups  that  are well-off. The  relative  ease 
of  effecting  income  transfers  through  government 
price  fting  in an inflationary  environment  encourages 
the formation  of special-interest  lobbies.  Inflation thus 
increases  the  incentive  to use  government-regulated 
prices  to  redistribute  income. 
After  the  mid-1960s,  in response  to pressure  from 
the  politically  potent  housing  lobby,  Congress  in- 
creasingly  subsidized  credit  to the  housing  industry. 
In September  1966,  Congress  passed  legislation  ex- 
tending  interest  rate ceilings to S&Ls.  These  Regula- 
tion  Q ceilings,  administered  jointly  by the  Fed,  the 
FDIC,  and  the  FHLBB,  were  set  at  a higher  level 
for S&Ls  than  for banks.  The  original  intention  was 
to  allocate  credit  directly  to  housing  by  making 
deposits  more  attractive  at  S&Ls  than  at  banks. 
Because  Reg  Q ceilings  were  not  raised  with  the  rise 
in  inflation  and  market  rates  after  1966,  Reg  Q 
became  an  instrument  for transferring  income  from 
holders  of small  deposits  to  the  housing  industry.4 
Holders  of small  deposits,  who  did  not  have  access 
to  money  market  instruments  paying  a competitive 
rate  of  return,  were  in  effect  taxed  at  a  rate  equal 
to  the  difference  between  the  market  interest  rate 
and  the  Reg  Q  ceiling  rate. 
Reg  Q  ceilings  subsidized  credit  to  housing  by 
keeping  interest  rates  on  thrift  deposits  below 
market  rates.  In  combination  with  the  prohibition 
of  adjustable-rate  mortgages,  these  ceilings  con- 
strained  thrifts  to  borrow  short-term  through 
passbook  savings  accounts,  while  making  them  lend 
long-term.  The  rise in inflation  in the  late  1970s  and 
early  1980s  produced  a rise  in  market  rates  and  in 
the  rates  at which  thrifts  borrowed.  Their  old mort- 
gages,  however,  continued  to  pay  the  lower  rates 
offered  in  the  less  inflationary  past.  Consequently, 
a majority  of thrifts  became  insolvent.  In the  absence 
of inflation,  there  would  have  been  no  thrift  crisis.5 
The  Nixon  wage  and  price  controls,  imposed  in 
August  1971  in  response  to  4  percent  inflation, 
created  extensive  new  opportunities  for the  political 
system  to redistribute  income  among  different  groups 
without  explicit  legislation.  Inevitably,  administration 
and  enforcement  of wage  and  price  controls  require 
considerable  discretion.  Wage  and  price  controls 
create  a shadow  fiscal  system  of implicit  taxes  and 
transfers. 
The  controls  on the  energy  industry  were  a good 
example  of how  the  political  system  combined  infla- 
tion with legislated  price fling  to redistribute  income. 
Price  controls  on oil were  kept  after  other  price  con- 
trols  were  eliminated.  In  his  book  review  of  Th 
Eio~omics and Politics  of Oil Price Regdation,  Henry 
Jacoby  (1984,  p.  1176)  comments: 
When  the  first  oil shock  occurred  there  was  a system  of oil 
price  controls  already  in place-a  hangover  from  the  Nixon 
anti-inflation  scheme  of  1971.  They  were  modified  and 
4 The  ceiling  rate  on commercial  bank  savings  deposits  was  set 
at  4 percent  in  1966,  4.5  percent  in  1970,  5 percent  in  1973, 
and  5.25  in  1979.  In  contrast  to  this  percent  1.25  percentage 
ooint  rise  from  1966  to  1979.  over  the  same  oeriod.  the  three- 
month  Treasury  bill rate  rose’almost  5 percentage  pbints,  from 
about  5 percent  to  10 percent.  In  May  1970,  this  inflation  tax 
was  effectively  restricted  to holders  of small  deposits  as a result 
of the  exemption  from  Reg  Q  ceilings  of certificates  of deposit 
in  denominations  of $100,000  or  greater. 
5 Because  deposit  insurance  allowed  insolvent  thrifts  to continue 
to  attract  deposits,  the  decision  whether  to  close  an  insolvent 
thrift  became  a political  decision  rather  than  a market  decision. 
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crude  oil so that  people  downstream  (oil refiners,  distribu- 
tors,  and  the  ultimate  consumers)  got  a lower  average  price 
of domestic-plus-imported  supplies.  . . . A shadow  system 
of public  finance,  unique  to  the  oil  sector,  was  created- 
complete  with  taxes,  transfers,  and (no surprise)  deadweight 
loss.  In practice  the  system  grew  to mind-bending  complex- 
ity as the  various  players  (regions,  consumers,  refiners,  and 
producers  holding  various  classes  of  oil  reserves)  fought 
over  the  goodies.6 
A very  contentious  issue  at  the  time  . . . was  the  question 
who  actually  benefited  from  the  $15$45  billion  (depending 
on the year)  producers  were  denied.  In the  mid-l  970s  there 
was  a group  of analysts  who  held  that  the  oil price  controls 
were  a fraud  to  the  consumer:  U.  S.  product  prices  were 
set  in world  product  markets  .  .  .  and  there  was  no  way 
for controls  on crude  oil to  affect  prices  at  the  pump.  The 
rents  were  being  transferred  to  refiners  in  the  form  of 
increased  margins. 
Rent  control  laws furnish  another  example  of the 
way  inflation  combines  with  government-regulated 
prices  to redistribute  income,  in this  case,  from  the 
owners  of the housing  stock  to renters.  Consider  also 
automobile  insurance:  in California,  Proposition  103, 
which  was passed  in a  1988  referendum,  called  for 
a rollback  in automobile  insurance  rates  of ‘20 per- 
cent.  The  constitutionality  of  the  rollback  is now 
being  litigated  in  the  courts.  Proposition  103  also 
mandated  that  the  state’s insurance  commissioner  be 
elected  in the  future.  Given  the  extensive  criticism 
of  the  cost  of  car  insurance  in  California,  it  is 
unlikely  that  the  next  commissioner  will raise  rates 
after  taking  office.  Inflation  will then  lower  the  real 
value  of insurance  rates,  regardless  of whether  the 
courts  sanction  a  rollback. 
VI. 
EROSION  OF  SUPPORT  FOR  THE 
PRICE  SYSTEM 
Inevitably,  in an inflationary  environment,  govern- 
ment  officials  blame  inflation  on  the  special  factors 
that  change  individual  prices.  In  an  environment 
where  no one accepts  responsibility  for inflation, com- 
petition  for  political  power  encourages  inflation 
scapegoating,  which  plays  on public  confusion  over 
“high”  and  “rising”  prices  by  attributing  inflation  to 
monopoly  power.  This  scapegoating  in turn  erodes 
public  support  for  resource  allocation  through  ‘the 
price  system. 
6 Ironically,  when  the  extent  of pollution  in Communist  coun- 
tries  appeared  in  1989,  the  price  system  of western  countries 
was  praised  for  having  produced  efficient  use  of  energy.  An 
article  in the Nm  Y&  7Imes (l/23/90,  p.  17) commented,  “The 
lack  of market  forces  kept  these  [Communist]  countries  from 
realizing  the  impressive  gains  in energy  efficiency  registered  in 
the  West  after  the  oil  shocks  of  the  Seventies.  .  .  .” 
Erosion  of support  for resource  allocation  through 
the  price  system  was especially  strong  in the  market 
for  home  construction.  The  cycle  of  inflation  and 
recession  that  began  in  the  mid-1960s  induced 
cyclical  boom  and  bust  conditions  in the  home  con- 
struction  market.  (Housing  construction,  like  other 
forms of investment,  falls more  sharply than  aggregate 
output  in  a  recession.)  Cyclical  downturns  in  the 
housing  and  construction  industry  created  the  im- 
pression  that  the  free-market  allocation  of  credit 
discriminated  against  specific  classes  of  users.  In 
particular,  the  concentration  of unemployment  in the 
construction  industry  created  the impression  that con- 
struction  workers  had to bear a disproportionate  share 
of  the  burden  of  reducing  inflation. 
Because  downturns  in housing  construction  were 
attributed  to  “high”  interest  rates,  they  created 
pressure  for  “cheap”  credit.’  Many  believed  that 
lower  interest  rates  for  housing  would  follow  from 
an increase  in the  supply  of credit  to housing  made 
possible by higher  money  growth.  In response  to con- 
stituent  pressure,  some  congressmen  pressured  the 
Fed  for higher money  growth  and lower interest  rates. 
These  congressmen  blamed  financial monopolies  for 
“high”  interest  rates.  “High”  interest  rates,  they 
argued,  .exacerbated  inflation  by  raising  the  cost  of 
doing  business.  In  1975,  the  cyclical  downturn  in 
housing  produced  House  bills  that  would  have  re- 
quired  the  Fed  to  set  a floor  of 6 percent  under  Ml 
growth  and “to allocate  credit  away from  inflationary 
uses,  and  toward  national  priority  uses,  including 
low- and  middle-income  housing”  (HR  3 161).8 
Rep.  Jim Wright  (US Cong.,  Z/4/75,  p.  7) made  the 
case  for  one  such  bill,  HR  2 12,  produced  by  the 
Democratic  Steering  and  Policy  Committee. 
REP.  WRIGHT:  With  any  given  supply  of  new  money 
overall,  a  credit  allocation  program  is  needed  to  channel 
credit  away from  nonproductive  speculative  and  inflationary 
uses,  such  as  corporate  takeovers,  excessive  inventory 
accumulation,  and speculation  in land and commodities,  and 
toward  credit-starved  priority  areas  of the  economy.  .  .  . 
HR  212  requests  the  Federal  Reserve  to  allocate  credit 
toward  priority  uses  and  away from  nonpriority  speculative 
and  inflationary  uses. 
7 Congress  was  especially  sensitive  to  this  pressure  because 
increases  in  deficits  during  recessions  created  the  appearance 
that  government  was  the  main  competitor  for  housing  credit. 
* Treasury  Secretary  Simon,  along  with  influential  members  of 
the  Senate  Banking  Committee,  opposed  these  bills.  As  a 
consequence,  they  emerged  in amended  form  as  House  Con- 
current  Resolution  133.  which  reauired  onlv  that  the  Fed 
periodically  consult  with  Congress  “over  ranges  of  growth  or 
diminution  of  monetary  and  credit  aggregates.” 
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tions with arguments  that  inflation arises from govern- 
ment  deficits  and monopoly  power  in labor  markets. 
Under  pressure  to lower  interest  rates,  he  defended 
money  markets  as  highly  competitive: 
SEN. BIDEN: Doctor,  on  occasion  you  have  also  indicated 
that  with  regard  to  interest  rates,  either  the  Fed  can’t  or 
shouldn’t  concentrate  on  lowering  interest  rates.  Yet  we 
are  faced  with  that  question  all the  time  here  in  the  Con- 
gress.  .  .  .  If the  Fed  can’t  or  shouldn’t  be  the  outfit  that 
concentrates  on  that,  who  should? 
DR.  BURNS: You  know,  you  could  leave  interest  rates 
alone.  After  all,  we  have  highly  competitive  money  and 
capital  markets.  If you  are going  to  engage  in price  control 
exercises,  you  ought  to  turn  to  those  sectors  of the  econ- 
omy  where  there  are  pockets  of monopoly.  .  .  . We  have 
pockets  of  monopoly  in  the  field  of  labor,  but  we  don’t 
talk  about  that.  (US  Cong.,  4/29/75,  p.  18) 
As  inflation  created  public  distrust  of  the  price 
system,  it  also  created  opportunities  to  subsidize 
users  of credit.  Rising  rates  of inflation  that  pushed 
market  rates  above  usury  ceilings  provided  a subsidy 
to  homeowners  who  obtained  mortgages  at  below- 
market  rates.  Homeowners  with  existing  mortgages, 
like other  debtors,  benefited  from  unexpectedly  high 
inflation.  Furthermore,  inflation  turned  existing 
federal  credit  programs  into  subsidies  for  the  home 
construction  industry.  These  programs  had  existed 
before  the  inflation  of the  mid-1960s.  The  rationale 
for  them  was  that  they  made  “it  possible  for  home 
owners  and rental  project  owners  to finance  the  con- 
struction  or  acquisition  of  housing  properties  at 
reasonable (italics  supplied)  levels  of  interest  rates” 
(US Cong.,  Z/28/64,  p.  22).  The  credit  extended  by 
these  programs  before  1965 was relatively  small,  and 
it  was  largely  extended  at  market  rates.  [See  US 
Cong.,  Z/28/64,  Table  3-Z.] With  inflation,  “reason- 
able”  levels  of interest  rates  became  historical  levels 
of interest  rates,  and “reasonable”  rates  became  sub- 
sidized  rates. 
By lessening  public  acceptance  of credit  allocation 
by  the  marketplace  and  by  increasing  the  ease  of 
hiding  subsidies,  inflation encouraged  myriad  govern- 
ment  interventions  in the  market  for housing  credit. 
These  interventions  disguised  the  social cost  of hous- 
ing,  which  led to a misallocation  of the  capital  stock. 
Government  intervention  also  produced  the  HUD 
scandals  and  the  S&L  bailout  of  the  1980s. 
VII. 
POLITICAL  SELF-INTEREST  AND 
THE COMMON  INTEREST 
Revenue  generated  by  inflation  financed  an 
increase  in  government  spending  relative  to  GNP 
after the  mid-1960s.  Because  this increase  in revenue 
did  not  have  to  be  explicitly  legislated,  it  allowed 
postponement  of a political  consensus  over  the  ac- 
ceptability  of the  increased  spending.  Prior  to index- 
ation  of the  personal  income  tax  in  1985,  inflation 
continuously  increased  tax  revenue  as  a percent  of 
GNP.  Periodic  “tax  cuts”  would  return  revenue  as 
a percent  of GNP  to its original base value.  The  prac- 
tice  of  imposing  continuous  tax  increases  through 
inflation,  while  legislating  offsetting  reductions  only 
occasionally,  raised  the  average  tax rate imposed  over 
time.  The  increase  in the  average  tax  rate  allowed 
Congress  to  raise  taxes  sufficiently  to  finance  the 
expansion  of income  transfer  programs,  while  post- 
poning  a decision  on whether  to legislate permanently 
taxes  sufficient  to  pay  for  them.  Inflation  allowed 
Congress  to  postpone  continually  its  constitutional 
responsibility  to  make  explicit,  publicly  debated 
decisions  on  the  share  of  resources  to  appropriate 
to  the  public  sector. 
The  distortions  produced  by continual  inflation and 
the  absence  of indexing  in  the  tax  code  gave  Con- 
gress  an incentive  to rewrite  the  tax code  periodically. 
Individuals  and corporations  necessarily  lobbied  Con- 
gress  on  an  ongoing  basis  to  protect  their  own  in- 
terests.  The  uncertainty  over  the  long-run  incidence 
of  taxes  acted  to  discourage  investment. 
VIII. 
CAN WE LEARN To LIVE 
WITH INFLATION? 
Is “high”  inflation  bad  and  “moderate”  inflation  all 
right?  Why  not  learn  to  live with  the  current  5 .per- 
cent  inflation? Historical  experience  offers no example 
where  positive  inflation  was  maintained  at  a steady 
rate  over  any  significant  period  of time.  Sustained 
inflation  is always  associated  with  a fluctuating  rate 
of  inflation.  The  reason  is  that,  in  an  inflationary 
environment,  the  incentive  for  the  political  system 
to  inflate  changes  continually.  First,  the  revenue 
raised  with  a  given  rate  of  inflation  tends  to  fall 
because  the  public  finds  ways  to reduce  the  base  of 
the  inflation tax.  For  example,  the  revenue  generated 
in  the  1970s  by  inflation  and  the  lack  of  indexing 
in the  corporate  income  tax fell as firms  shifted  from 
long-term  to short-term  investments,  which  could  be 
depreciated  over  a short  time  period.  Second,  the 
income  transfers  to politically  influential  constituen- 
cies  produced  by  the  combination  of  inflation  and 
price  controls  tend  to  fall  as  the  public  finds  ways 
to  circumvent  the  price  controls.  For  example,  in 
the  1970s  money  funds  allowed  individuals  to  by- 
pass  Reg  Q  by  holding  money  market  instruments 
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the  revenue  raised  and  the  income  transfers  effected 
by  inflation  fall over  time.  Political  pressures  to  off- 
set  this  fall through  an  increase  in the  inflation  rate 
create  instability  in  inflation. 
Finally,  because  the  size of the  federal  government 
deficit  varies  with  changes  in the  rate  of growth  of 
output,  a concern  over  government  deficits  produces 
pressure  for  expansionary  monetary  policy.  In  the 
absence  of a clear mandate  to stabilize  the price  level, 
large  government  deficits  will  continue  to  create 
political pressures  for the  inflationary  monetary  policy 
that  has  characterized  the  last  three  decades. 
Ix. 
CONCLUSION 
The  only way to assure  a stable  monetary  environ- 
ment  is to replace  the  exercise  of ongoing  discretion 
over  the  desired  price  level  with  a rule  that  makes 
price  level  determination  part  of the  constitutional 
framework  of government.  In a recent  editorial,  Th 
Financial Zhes  of London  (l/23/90,  p.  16)  stated, 
The  notion  that  money  must  fall within  the  domain  of day- 
to-day  politics  is  a  ZOth-century  heresy.  .  .  .  Painful 
experience  with  the  modern  manipulation  of  monetary 
policy suggests  that  money  is more  appropriately  an element 
of the  constitutional  framework  of democracy  than  an object 
of the  political  struggle.  Monetary  stability  is  a necessary 
condition  for  a working  market  economy,  which  is itself  a 
basis  for  a  stable  democracy. 
The  purpose  of a rule  is to  reduce  the  incentive 
for  special-interest  constituencies  to  form  with  the 
goal  of  either  redistributing  income  through  the 
political  system  in a way that  does  not  reflect  a social 
consensus  explicitly  ratified  through  the  legislative 
process  or of redistributing  income  in an arbitrary  way 
away from  minority  groups.  This  rationale  for a rule 
means  that  a  rule  must  be  exactly  what  its  name 
implies-a  guiding  principle  with  no exceptions.  The 
central  bank  cannot  condition  the  political  system 
to  respect  its  independence  if politicians  know  that 
the  central  bank  makes  exceptions  to  its  rules. 
This  argument  has  wider  application  than  just  to 
a rule  for  price  level  stability.  For  example,  unlike 
most  other  central  banks,  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  has  never  interfered  in the  foreign  exchange 
market  by  allocating  foreign  exchange  at  favorable 
rates  to politically  influential  importers.  This  rule has 
worked  well.  Similarly,  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
has  avoided  allocating  credit  among  competing 
private  uses.  The  primary  manifestation  of the  rule 
not  to allocate  credit  is an unwillingness  to allow  in- 
‘solvent financial  institutions  to use the  discount  win- 
dow.  Use  of the  discount  window  by insolvent  finan- 
cial  institutions  would  move  credit  allocation  away 
from  its  free  market  allocation.  Again,  this  rule  has 
worked  well. It is evident  that  if either  rule were  made 
subject  to  exceptions,  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
would  come  under  regular  political  pressure  to make 
exceptions.  Hopefully,  passage  of the  Neal  Resolu- 
tion  will  make  price  level  stability  a  rule  that  is 
followed  with  no  exceptions. 
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This  appendix  reviews  quantitative  estimates  of 
five separate  increases  in federal  revenue  in 1974 due 
to  the  inflation  that  year  of  11  percent. 
Added  Seigniorage:  The  outstanding  stock  of 
base money  (currency  in circulation,  foreign and other 
deposits  at the  Fed,  and  member  bank  reserves)  in 
1974  was  $111  billion.  With  inflation  at  11 percent 
in  1974,  the  public  had  to add  an additional  11 per- 
cent  to holdings  of base  money  in order  to maintain 
its  real  value.  (This  addition  to  base  money  is 
equivalent  to  a tax  collected  by  the  government  in 
that  it  allows  the  government  to  finance  additional 
expenditures.)  Seigniorage  in  1974,  therefore,  can 
be  put  at  about  $12.2  billion  ($111  x  .ll). 
Lower  Real  Interest  on  Outstanding 
Treasury  Debt: As of June  1974,  the Treasury  paid 
an  average  rate  of  interest  of  6.56  percent  on  its 
outstanding  debt.  At this  time,  the  average  maturity 
of this  debt  was 3 years.  The  market  rate  of interest 
on  a 3-year  Treasury  note  was  8.33  percent.  The 
difference  in  the  market  rate  and  the  average  rate 
paid  (1.77)  is an estimate  of the  extent  to which  past 
issues  of federal  debt  failed to incorporate  adequately 
a premium  for  future  inflation.  With  $254.5  billion 
of  debt  held  by  private  investors,  the  gain  to  the 
government  from unanticipated  inflation  in  1974  was 
$4.5  billion  (.0177  x  $254.56). 
Income  Tax  Bracket  Creep:  Before  the  index- 
ing  that  took  effect  in  1985,  inflation  increased  the 
real  revenue  raised  by  the  personal  income  tax.  In- 
flation  eroded  the  real  value  of the  standard  deduc- 
tion,  the  personal  exemption,  and  the  low-income 
allowance.  Because  the  rate  structure  of the  personal 
income  tax was progressive  before  1985 with  respect 
to  nominaf income,  inflation  increased  real revenue 
by  increasing  individuals’  nomirza~  income.  Fellner, 
Clarkson  and  Moore  (1975)  use  a stratified  sample 
of tax  returns  from  the  Internal  Revenue  Service  in 
order  to  calculate  the  increase  in  revenue  in  1974 
due  to  inflation.  They  apply  the  actual  tax  code  in 
1974 to these  returns  and also a hypothetical  tax code 
whose  nominal  provisions  are adjusted  upward  by the 
rate  of inflation  in  1974.  They  conclude  that  infla- 
tion  in  1974  increased  revenue  from  the  personal 
income  tax  by  $6.7  billion. 
This  figure  is fairly close  to a rough  estimate  from 
aggregate  figures.  Between  1973  and  1974,  nominal 
personal  income  increased  9.7  percent.  Inflation 
(measured  by  both  the  CPI  and  the  consumption 
expenditures  deflator),  however,  rose  by  11 percent, 
so  real  income  declined  by  about  1  percent.  An 
indexed  tax code  that  caused  changes  in real revenue 
to reflect  only changes  in real personal  income,  then, 
would  have produced  an increase  in nominal  personal 
tax  receipts  of .about  8.7  percent  (9.7  percent  -  1 
percent).  In fact,  personal  tax  receipts  rose  by  14.3 
percent.  These  figures  suggest  an  elasticity  of  real 
revenue  from  the  personal  income  tax  with  respect 
to  inflation  of  .64  [(14.3  -  8.7)/8.7].  In  1973, 
personal  tax  receipts  were  $107.3  billion.  The  real 
tax  increase  due  to  inflation,  then,  was  about  $6 
billion  ($107.36  x .087  x .64),  which  is close  to the 
Fellner  et al.  figure. 
Nominal  Capital  Gains  Taxation:  Inflation  in- 
creases  the  real  revenue  raised  by  the  capital  gains 
tax because  increases  in the  dollar value  of assets  due 
to  inflation  are  taxed  as  real  rather  than  nominal 
gains.  Feldstein  and  Slemrod  (1978)  estimate  that 
inflation  caused  the  tax  on  capital  gains  to generate 
an  additional  revenue  of $.5  billion  in  1973.  (This 
figure is a lower estimate  of the revenue  gain for 1974, 
when  the  inflation  rate  was  higher  than  in  1973.) 
Corporate  Income  Tax:  Inflation  raises  the  real 
revenue  from  the  corporate  income  tax.  Fellner, 
Clarkson  and  Moore  (1975)  also  calculate  the  in- 
crease  in  corporate  taxes  in  1974  due  to  inflation. 
In these  calculations,  they  adjust  corporate  deprecia- 
tion  allowances  for  inflation,  so that  depreciation  is 
at replacement  cost,  rather  than  historical  cost.  They 
also  reduce  profits  due  to  the  nominal  gain  in  the 
dollar  value  of inventories  caused  by inflation.  They 
estimate  that  inflation  increased  corporate  taxes  in 
1974  by  $10  billion.  [This  figure  may  be  an 
underestimate.  Feldstein  and  Summers  (1979) 
estimate  that  inflation  in  1977  of only  6.8  percent 
increased  the  taxes  of nonfinancial  corporations  by 
$32  billion.  That  is,  in  1977,  inflation  raised  the 
effective  corporate  tax  rate  from  41  percent  to  66 
percent.] 
Totals:  The  shares  of the  inflation tax contributed 
by  the  separate  parts  of the  tax  code  in  1974  were 
seigniorage  36.0  percent.,  depreciation  of  existing 
government  debt  13.3  percent,  personal  income  tax 
excluding  capital  gains  19.8  percent,  capital  gains 
1.5 percent,  and  corporate  tax  29.5  percent.  These 
relative  shares,  however,  underestimate  the  impor- 
tance  of the  personal  income  tax  component  of the 
52  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  MARCH/APRIL  1990 inflation  tax.  A constant  inflation  rate would  generate 
the  same  amount  of revenue  each year from the  other 
components  (abstracting  from  reductions  that  occur 
as the  public  learns  how  to  evade  the  inflation  tax). 
In contrast,  revenue  increases  from  the  personal  in- 
come  tax  were  cumulative  because  each  year  tax- 
payers  were  forced  into  higher  tax  brackets.  The 
cumulative  increase  in  revenue  was  only  limited 
because  taxpayers  could  not be forced  into a marginal 
tax  bracket  higher  than  70  percent. 
The  figures  listed  above  for  the  separate  com- 
ponents  of the  inflation tax add to $33.9  billion. That 
is,  if the  tax  code  had  been  indexed  for  inflation  in 
1974,  federal  revenue  would  have  been  lower  by 
$33.9  billion.  In  1974,  federal  government  revenue, 
exclusive  of social  security  taxes,  was  $198  billion. 
In  1974, therefore,  17 percent  of revenue  was derived 
from inflation.  Of course,  Congress  reduced  tax rates 
on  an  ad  hoc  basis  to  keep  the  overall  tax  burden 
relative  to  GNP  fairly  constant.  These  reductions, 
however,  occurred  only  sporadically.  The  steady 
increase  in real  revenue  produced  by  inflation  com- 
bined  with  occasional  reductions  in tax  rates  raised 
the  average  tax  rate  over  time. 
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